In a case of first impression, Supreme Court, Richmond County (Maltese, J.), held in Shipley v. Williams that a brother and sister who lived together in the same house constituted "immediate family" in the "zone of danger" tort analysis.  The "zone of danger" analysis is essentially a policy  that restricts recovery for damages from emotional distress when a person witnesses a serious injury or death of an immediate family member caused by the defendant, and that person is within the zone of danger.  Here, a sister and brother were involved in an automobile accident in which the sister witnessed her brother sustain serious physical injury and death, and the sister subsequently sought damages for emotional distress.

The defendant sought to dismiss that emotional distress cause of action based on the argument that the sister did not constitute "immediate family" because the sister was of a second degree of consanguinity, and the analysis applied only to "immediate family" members of a first degree of consanguinity.  Justice Maltese rejected that analysis and analyzed how the Legislature has defined "immediate family" in several other statutes.  The New York Court of Appeals has not yet defined the term "immediate family."