This week, the New York Court of Appeals will hear oral arguments in Stringer v. Musacchia.  The issue in Stringer concerns whether the plaintiff's "work" falls within the protection of Labor Law sec. 240(1).  The facts of this case are important because it turns on whether the plaintiff was performing voluntarily services just before his accident.

The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder while constructing a shed on the defendants' property. The plaintiff was a self-employed construction contractor.  He agreed to build the shed for his friend, the defendant, in return for his inclusion in a hunting trip organized by the defendant on the defendants' property.  The defendant friend organized hunting trips annually; most guests were expected to work on the property in the afternoon after hunting in the morning.

The defendant friend permitted the plaintiff to attend the hunting trip in exchange for his labor in building the shed.  The plaintiff conceded that he was not compensated for building the shed, that he did not expect to receive any remuneration, and that he paid his own travel expenses.

The Appellate Division, Third Department's Majority held that the "work" was not encompassed under the protections of Labor Law sec. 240(1).  The Majority reasoned that, despite the intangible benefit that the plaintiff might have enjoyed from participating in the hunt, because the plaintiff chose to volunteer his services, was under no obligation to complete the shed and knew that he would receive no monetary consideration, he was not an employee entitled to the protections of the Labor Law.

Justices Spain and Peters disagreed, stating, "Regardless of whether a worker such as [the] plaintiff was required to pay for the hunting event and was monetarily compensated for building the shed, or was charged to participate in the hunt and deemed to be thereafter paying off that debt incurred by erecting the shed . . .. or–as here– a quid pro quo barter arrangement was entered in which no money was exchanged, the construction work such as performed by [the] plaintiff was not gratuitous; rather, it was substantially equivalent to acting as a general contractor to design, oversee and complete the building of a structure."