New York’s Scaffold Law remains one of the most powerful liability statutes in personal injury litigation. But the 2026 decisions show a developing trend that impacts insurers, claims professionals, contractors, property owners, and defense counsel:
Courts are not weakening Labor Law § 240(1) once it applies. Instead, they are scrutinizing whether the case belongs inside the Scaffold Law in the first place.
That is the important 2026 trend.
The best way to describe it is “scope-first gatekeeping.” Courts are asking threshold questions before reaching the familiar strict-liability analysis:
Was the plaintiff a covered worker?
Was the plaintiff performing an enumerated activity?
Was the task construction-related work, or merely routine service work?
Was the device being used as a safety device, or merely as a passageway?
Was the accident caused by the kind of elevation-related risk Labor Law § 240(1) was designed to address?
Those questions are becoming the center of the defense analysis.
The Scaffold Law Still Applies Strongly in Classic Ladder Cases
The 2026 cases do not show a retreat from Labor Law § 240(1) in traditional ladder-fall cases. When a worker is performing covered work and an unsecured ladder shifts, moves, wobbles, or collapses, courts continue to treat that as a serious Scaffold Law problem for defendants.
In Amancha v 720-730 Fort Washington Avenue Owners Corp., the First Department granted the plaintiff summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The plaintiff was working on a renovation project from an unsecured A-frame ladder when the ladder suddenly moved and caused him to fall. The court rejected the defense expert’s opinion as speculative, particularly because the expert examined a ladder two years after the accident and the record did not establish that it was the same ladder.
The key point from Amancha is straightforward: if the plaintiff is engaged in covered work and the ladder shifts for no apparent reason, the defendants face a difficult summary judgment record.
The Second Department reached a similar result in Bista v State of New York. There, the claimant’s deposition testimony established that an unsecured ladder moved suddenly and tilted to the left, causing him to fall. The Court held that the claimant established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim.
And in Szczesiak v Ery Tenant LLC, the First Department again treated an unsecured and defective ladder as an inadequate safety device. The plaintiff was working approximately 11 feet above the ground when the ladder moved, wobbled, shifted, and fell. The Court rejected the attempt to defeat summary judgment through arguments that focused on the plaintiff’s conduct rather than the failure of the elevation safety device.
These cases show that the Scaffold Law remains plaintiff-friendly in classic elevation-device cases. A ladder case is still dangerous for the defense when the plaintiff was doing covered work and the ladder was unsecured, unstable, or inadequate.
The New Trend: Courts Are Testing Whether the Claim Falls Inside § 240(1)
The more defense-friendly 2026 trend appears at the threshold. New York courts are asking whether the plaintiff, the work, the device, and the accident actually fit within Labor Law § 240(1).
That is where defendants are gaining traction.
In Buckley v Hearst Corp., the First Department dismissed the Labor Law § 240(1) claim because the plaintiff was not engaged in covered work at the time of the incident. The plaintiff was present while a consulting engineer inspected façade work that had already been completed. He was there to answer questions during the inspection. That was not enough.
The lesson from Buckley is being present at a construction-related location is not the same as performing covered construction work. The defense should identify exactly what the plaintiff was doing at the moment of the accident.
The same concept appears in Hearns v Blended Family LLC. The plaintiff, a telecommunications worker, claimed he was injured when a ladder shifted while he was running cable. He argued that his work constituted an “alteration” under Labor Law § 240(1). The First Department disagreed. The court held that drilling two holes to run cable wire did not constitute the kind of construction-related alteration covered by the statute.
Hearns is a strong example of the 2026 trend. The Court did not say that a shifting ladder is unimportant. Instead, it asked whether the plaintiff was performing covered work. Because the task did not effect a significant physical change to the building or structure, the Scaffold Law claim failed.
That distinction is important. A plaintiff may be on a ladder. The ladder may shift. The accident may involve gravity. But Labor Law § 240(1) still does not apply unless the plaintiff was engaged in one of the statute’s protected activities.
Passageways Are Not Automatically Scaffold Law Safety Devices
Another important 2026 development involves workers who fall while using planks, temporary routes, or access points at construction sites.
In Estrella v BMG Monroe I, LLC, the injured plaintiff fell after attempting to use a metal plank as a passageway over or near a trench at a worksite. The Second Department dismissed the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The court held that the metal plank was being used as a passageway, not as one of the safety devices contemplated by the Scaffold Law.
That is a useful defense case. Plaintiffs often argue that any elevated plank, board, or temporary access device at a construction site should be analyzed under Labor Law § 240(1). Estrella shows that the analysis is more specific. New York courts will ask how the item was actually being used.
Was it a scaffold, ladder, hoist, or other elevation safety device?
Or was it simply a passageway?
That distinction can decide the case.
The “Sole Proximate Cause” Defense Remains Difficult
While courts are showing more interest in threshold coverage questions, they continue to reject weak sole-proximate-cause arguments.
In Portillos v Moxie Property Solutions LLC, the defendants argued that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injury because he had been instructed not to stand on a roof. The motion court rejected that argument, emphasizing that an instruction to avoid unsafe practices is not itself a safety device.
A “do not do that” instruction usually will not defeat a Labor Law § 240(1) claim unless the defense can also show that proper, available, adequate safety devices were provided and that the plaintiff refused to use them or misused them for no good reason.
A general safety instruction is not enough.
That means defendants should be careful before making sole proximate cause the centerpiece of the defense. The stronger argument may be that the accident is not a Scaffold Law case at all.
The Defense Trend: Start With Coverage Before Conduct
The 2026 cases suggest that the defense should start with four threshold questions:
- Was the plaintiff a covered worker?
- Was the plaintiff engaged in erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, or pointing?
- Did the work cause a significant physical change to the building or structure?
- Was the object or device actually being used as a Scaffold Law safety device?
Only after those questions are answered should the defense focus on whether the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause.
That is the practical shift.
The defense should not start with: “The plaintiff should have been more careful.”
The better defense starts with: “This accident does not fall within Labor Law § 240(1).”
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