New York Civil Law

The Expert Can Be Anonymous. The Expertise Cannot Be

Leuterio v Bradley Draws an Important Line Under CPLR 3101(d)

At a Glance

Summary: A medical-malpractice plaintiff may withhold the name of a retained medical expert. But Leuterio v Bradley holds that the plaintiff cannot also conceal the expert’s qualifications, training, board certifications, and specialties without making the showing required for a protective order.

Case: Leuterio v Bradley, 2026 NY Slip Op 51206(U), 89 Misc 3d 1239(A) (Sup Ct, NY County 2026)

Court: Supreme Court, New York County

Decision Date: July 28, 2026

Topic: CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), expert disclosure, CPLR 3103 protective orders, and CPLR 3212(b) summary judgment practice

What Happened

The plaintiff brought a medical-malpractice action against a physician, Lenox Hill Hospital, and Northwell Health. The defendants moved for summary judgment.

To oppose the motion, the plaintiff submitted an affirmation from a retained medical expert. The expert’s name was redacted, which is permitted in medical-malpractice litigation under CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i).

But the plaintiff redacted much more than the name.

The affirmation also concealed the expert’s qualifications, training, advanced healthcare degrees, board certifications, areas of expertise, and specialties. The defendants therefore had the expert’s opinions, but little information from which to determine whether the expert was qualified to give them.

The court initially directed the plaintiff to submit an unredacted affirmation for in camera review and then required the plaintiff to move for a protective order if she wanted to continue withholding the expert’s professional qualifications.

The plaintiff argued that the information did not yet have to be disclosed because the deadline for formal CPLR 3101(d) expert disclosure was still months away. She relied in part on the 2015 amendment to CPLR 3212(b), which prevents a court from rejecting an expert affidavit on summary judgment merely because a CPLR 3101(d) exchange had not previously been served.

The question therefore became narrower than whether an expert could remain anonymous:

Could the plaintiff also withhold the information necessary to determine whether the anonymous expert was qualified to render the opinions being offered?

The Court’s Decision

Justice John J. Kelley disagreed with the plaintiff’s position.

The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order and required disclosure of the expert’s qualifications, types and dates of advanced or graduate healthcare degrees, training, board certifications, and specialties.

The expert’s name could remain confidential. The plaintiff also did not have to identify the educational institutions where the expert earned the degrees.

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a medical-malpractice litigant to withhold an expert’s name. It does not automatically permit the litigant to withhold every fact from which the adversary and the court can evaluate the expert’s competence.

The court also rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on the 2015 amendment to CPLR 3212(b). Looking to the amendment’s legislative history, Justice Kelley concluded that it addressed when expert proof may be submitted on summary judgment. It did not change what information may be withheld about an expert once that expert is used to support or oppose the motion.

The plaintiff therefore needed to establish a basis for the broader protection she sought under CPLR 3103(a). That required a showing that disclosure probably would reveal the expert’s identity and would probably expose the expert to unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice.

The court found that showing lacking.

The practical result was a middle ground: the expert could remain anonymous, but the defense was entitled to enough information to determine whether the witness was actually qualified to give the opinions contained in the affirmation. 

CPLR 3101(d) Draws the Distinction

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) ordinarily requires disclosure, in reasonable detail, of the expert’s subject matter, expected opinions, qualifications, and the grounds for those opinions.

The statute then creates a specific exception for medical, dental, and podiatric malpractice actions. The party may omit the expert’s name.

But the statute does not create the same categorical exemption for everything else.

It expressly provides that the party must disclose the other information concerning the expert otherwise required by the paragraph. 

That distinction has long mattered in New York expert disclosure.

In Thomas v Alleyne, 302 AD2d 36 (2d Dept 2002), the Second Department held that defendants in medical-malpractice cases are presumptively entitled to disclosure of an expert’s qualifications in reasonable detail. Additional protection requires proof both that the information probably would reveal the expert’s identity and that disclosure probably would cause the expert the type of prejudice contemplated by CPLR 3103(a). 

The Third Department later addressed the same problem in Kanaly v DeMartino, 162 AD3d 142 (3d Dept 2018). Modern research tools may make it easier to identify an expert from professional information. But that reality does not justify reducing expert disclosure to the point where an adversary cannot adequately prepare to address the expert. 

Leuterio applied those principles to an expert being used on summary judgment.

Why CPLR 3212(b) Did Not Change the Answer

The plaintiff had a substantial procedural argument.

The 2015 amendment to CPLR 3212(b) provides that a court may not refuse to consider an expert affidavit on summary judgment simply because a CPLR 3101(d) expert exchange had not already been furnished.

The plaintiff argued that formal expert disclosure was not yet due under the scheduling order. Therefore, the argument went, the plaintiff should not have to disclose the expert’s qualifications merely because the expert was needed to oppose summary judgment.

Justice John J. Kelley rejected that reading.

The amendment addressed timing.

It prevented a party from losing the ability to use necessary expert proof on summary judgment merely because the formal CPLR 3101(d) exchange had not already occurred.

It did not create a separate class of summary-judgment experts whose qualifications could remain undisclosed. 

That is an important distinction:

CPLR 3212(b) permits an expert to be used before the ordinary expert-disclosure deadline. It does not necessarily permit the expert to appear without disclosing the information needed to evaluate the expert’s qualifications.

Claims Professional and Defense Counsel Lessons

1. Separate the expert’s identity from the expert’s qualifications

Do not frame the objection as “the expert is anonymous.”

That generally misses the point in a medical-malpractice action.

Ask instead whether enough information has been disclosed to determine the expert’s specialty, relevant training, board certifications, experience, and competency to offer the particular opinion.

2. Audit the credentials before attacking the opinion

An expert may sound authoritative while offering an opinion outside the expert’s demonstrated field.

Before preparing reply papers, compare the disclosed qualifications with each substantive opinion.

For every important conclusion, ask:

That analysis can be more useful than simply characterizing the opinion as conclusory.

3. Do not treat CPLR 3212(b) as a disclosure exemption

The 2015 amendment solved a timing problem.

It prevents rejection of expert proof merely because the CPLR 3101(d) exchange had not already been served.

It does not follow that every fact concerning the expert may therefore be withheld until trial.

Leuterio makes that distinction explicit. 

4. Challenge over-redaction promptly

If the expert affirmation is being used to defeat summary judgment, waiting until trial may surrender the most useful opportunity to address the problem.

Identify the missing qualification information in reply.

Where necessary, seek appropriate disclosure or relief while the motion is still pending.

The point is not additional discovery for its own sake.

The point is determining whether the evidence offered to create a triable issue actually comes from a witness qualified to offer it.

5. Make the objection specific

“Plaintiff failed to identify the expert” is ordinarily not enough in this setting.

A stronger record identifies exactly what is missing and why it matters.

For example:

The expert offers an orthopedic causation opinion, but the disclosure does not reveal whether the physician practices orthopedics.

The expert criticizes a surgical technique, but nothing disclosed establishes surgical training in that procedure.

The expert gives a prognosis opinion, but the disclosed background does not identify experience treating the condition.

Specificity gives the court something concrete to decide.

6. Claims professionals should ask one additional question

When counsel reports that “plaintiff has an expert,” ask:

What do we know about the expert’s qualifications to give this opinion?

The existence of an expert affirmation can materially affect motion risk and settlement value.

So can a weakness in the expert’s qualifications.

Both belong in the evaluation.

Conclusion

Leuterio v Bradley does not eliminate the protection New York gives medical experts in malpractice litigation.

The expert’s name could remain confidential.

But confidentiality was not allowed to make the expert functionally unreviewable.

CPLR 3101(d) requires disclosure of expert qualifications for a reason. The adversary must be able to evaluate whether the person offering the opinion has the training and experience necessary to give it. And the court ultimately must be able to do the same.

The 2015 amendment to CPLR 3212(b) did not change that. It allows expert proof to be used on summary judgment even though the formal expert exchange has not already occurred. It does not turn the expert into a black box.

For defense counsel, the practical lesson is simple:

When an anonymous expert appears, do not ask only what the expert says. Ask what the record shows the expert is qualified to say.

Forward This Post

If this analysis affects a claim file, coverage position, or motion strategy, forward it to the person handling the issue.

Read more analysis from New York Civil Law here.

Questions This Case Answers

Sources

  1. Treating Physician Expert Disclosure Under CPLR § 3101(d) — the Third Department addresses CPLR 3101(d) disclosure when a treating physician will offer expert causation testimony. Read the analysis.
  2. Civil Procedure & Motion Practice — New York CPLR decisions addressing discovery, summary judgment, sanctions, preservation, and motion strategy. Explore the resource center
  3. Trial Practice & Strategy — expert proof, evidentiary foundations, preservation, witness examination, and courtroom strategy. Explore Trial Practice & Strategy
  4. Personal Injury Defense — practical resources concerning medical proof, expert disclosure, causation, discovery, damages, and trial exposure. Explore Personal Injury Defense

Photo Credit: Sasun Bughdaryan

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