New York Settlement Setoffs: Contribution, Indemnity, and § 15-108

Decision Date: September 24, 2026
Case: Castracane v Kasmier, 2026 NY Slip Op 05447 (3d Dept 2026)
Court: Appellate Division, Third Department

A settlement with one defendant does not necessarily end that defendant’s importance to the case.

In Castracane v Kasmier, the Third Department addressed the effect of a settlement on contribution and common-law indemnification claims in a multi-defendant negligence action. The decision also provides a useful reminder for claims professionals: even after a co-defendant settles, the settling defendant’s percentage of fault may remain important under General Obligations Law § 15-108.


At a Glance

Summary: The Third Department held that a settling tortfeasor was protected from contribution claims under General Obligations Law § 15-108. Although a settlement does not automatically extinguish a valid common-law indemnification claim, indemnification was unavailable because the remaining defendants faced liability for their own alleged negligence rather than vicarious liability for the settling defendant’s conduct.

Claims Issue: After one defendant settles, claims professionals should separately analyze contribution, indemnification, and the potential § 15-108 reduction available to the remaining defendants.


What Happened

The plaintiff was an independent contractor delivering packages for Amazon.

According to the complaint, Amazon directed him to make a delivery to the rear entrance of a residence in Albany County. After making the delivery, the plaintiff was allegedly attacked by two dogs while returning to his vehicle.

The plaintiff sued Amazon, the owners of the dogs, and the owner of the property.

The claims against Amazon were based on its alleged direction that the plaintiff deliver the package to the rear entrance. The claims against the dog owners and property owner were different. Those defendants were alleged to have known or to have had reason to know, of the dogs’ vicious propensities and to have failed to properly control them.

The non-Amazon defendants asserted cross-claims against Amazon for contribution and common-law indemnification.

Amazon later settled with the plaintiff and obtained a release.

Supreme Court dismissed the contribution claims against Amazon but allowed the common-law indemnification claims to remain.

Amazon appealed.


Contribution Was Barred by the Settlement

General Obligations Law § 15-108 provides protection for a tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff.

Among other things, the statute bars contribution claims against the settling tortfeasor.

The Third Department therefore agreed that the remaining defendants could no longer pursue Amazon for contribution.

That part of the analysis was straightforward.

The more interesting issue involved common-law indemnification.


Settlement Does Not Automatically Eliminate Common-Law Indemnification

The court distinguished contribution from indemnification.

A settlement that triggers General Obligations Law § 15-108 bars contribution, but it does not necessarily extinguish a legally viable claim for common-law indemnification.

The distinction rests on the nature of the two remedies.

Contribution apportions loss among parties who share responsibility for an injury.

Common-law indemnification is different. It permits a party that is without fault but is nevertheless held liable by operation of law because of its relationship to the negligent party to shift the entire loss to the party responsible for the wrongdoing.

The remaining defendants argued that Amazon was responsible for directing the plaintiff to the location where the dog attack occurred.

The Third Department held that this was not enough.


The Remaining Defendants Faced Liability for Their Own Conduct

The claims against the dog owners and property owner were based on their own alleged negligence.

The plaintiff alleged that they knew or should have known of the dogs’ vicious propensities and failed to control them.

Their potential liability therefore did not arise solely because of Amazon’s conduct.

For common-law indemnification to apply, the party seeking indemnity generally must be free from fault and subject to liability only because of the operation of law or its relationship to the party at fault.

That was not the theory pleaded against the remaining defendants.

The Third Department therefore dismissed the common-law indemnification claims against Amazon.


Greater Fault Is Not Indemnification

One of the most useful portions of Castracane is the court’s treatment of the remaining defendants’ argument that Amazon was more responsible for the accident.

Even if Amazon bore greater responsibility, that would not create a common-law indemnification claim.

The relative degree of fault among tortfeasors is a question of apportionment.

Common-law indemnification requires something different: a party without fault that has nevertheless been held responsible for the conduct of another.

A defendant cannot convert an allocation-of-fault argument into an indemnification claim simply by asserting that another party was more negligent.


The Settling Defendant’s Fault Can Still Affect the Claim

Once Amazon settled, the remaining defendants could no longer obtain contribution from it.

Amazon’s conduct, however, did not disappear from the case.

General Obligations Law § 15-108(a) provides for a reduction of the plaintiff’s claim after a settlement with one tortfeasor.

The reduction is generally measured by the greatest of:

The third measure can become significant in a substantial case.

Assume, for example, that a defendant settles for $100,000. At trial, the jury later attributes 40% of a $1 million loss to that settling defendant.

The remaining defendants may have a substantial interest in establishing that percentage of fault even though they can no longer pursue the settling defendant for contribution.

The settlement ends one form of risk transfer. It does not end the fault-allocation analysis.


Claims Handling After a Co-Defendant Settles

When one defendant settles, the remaining claim should be reassessed in several separate parts.

First, determine which cross-claims are extinguished by the settlement.

Second, determine whether any contractual or common-law indemnification claim survives.

Third, examine whether the settling defendant’s conduct can still reduce the insured’s exposure under General Obligations Law § 15-108.

The evidence supporting that allocation should be considered before discovery closes.

That may include:

A settling defendant may no longer have a financial interest in defending the case. The remaining defendants may therefore bear the responsibility for developing the proof necessary to place the settling defendant’s fault before the jury.


Trial Strategy Should Account for the Settling Defendant

The issue should also be considered when preparing the case for trial.

If the defense intends to seek an allocation of fault to the settling defendant, counsel should address the evidence necessary to support that allocation and consider how the settling defendant will be treated on the verdict sheet.

A settlement can change the parties appearing in the caption without eliminating the factual role of the settling defendant.

For a claims professional evaluating exposure, this distinction can affect both valuation and reserves.

The settlement amount alone does not necessarily measure the financial benefit to the remaining defendants. The settling defendant’s equitable share of fault may ultimately be more important.


Contribution, Indemnification, and § 15-108 Serve Different Functions

Castracane is also a useful reminder not to treat contribution, indemnification, and a statutory settlement reduction as interchangeable concepts.

Contribution apportions liability among parties that share responsibility.

Common-law indemnification shifts liability from a party held responsible without fault to the party whose conduct caused the loss.

General Obligations Law § 15-108 governs the effect of a settlement with one tortfeasor on the plaintiff’s remaining claims and the liability of the nonsettling defendants.

Each doctrine answers a different question.

In a multi-party claim, the analysis should address all three separately.


Claims Practice Point

After a co-defendant settles, claims professionals should not close the file on that defendant’s conduct.

The contribution claim may be gone, but the evidence concerning the settling’s defendants fault may still affect the insured’s ultimate exposure.

Counsel and the claims handler should identify early whether an allocation to the settling defendant will be pursued and preserve the proof necessary to support it.


Questions This Case Answers

Does a settlement eliminate contribution claims against the settling defendant?
Generally, yes, where General Obligations Law § 15-108 applies.

Does the settlement automatically eliminate common-law indemnification?
No. A valid indemnification claim may survive, but only if the legal requirements for indemnification are otherwise satisfied.

Can a defendant obtain common-law indemnification by showing that the settling defendant was more at fault?
No. Relative fault concerns apportionment, not indemnification.

Can the settling defendant’s fault still affect the judgment?
Yes. The settling’s equitable share may affect the reduction available under General Obligations Law § 15-108.

Should discovery concerning the settling defendant stop after settlement?
Not necessarily. If the remaining defendants intend to seek an allocation of fault to the settlor, that evidence may still be essential.


Practice Implications

For claims professionals handling multi-defendant losses, Castracane supports a disciplined approach after settlement.

Do not treat “settled” as synonymous with “irrelevant.”

Identify what claims have been extinguished. Determine whether any indemnification theory remains viable. Then evaluate whether proof of the settling defendant’s fault can reduce the exposure of the insured who remains in the case.

For litigators, the same analysis should shape discovery, motion practice, witness preparation, and the proposed verdict sheet.

Castracane is a useful illustration of how New York separates contribution, indemnification, and settlement setoffs, and why those distinctions can have a direct effect on the value of a claim.


Primary Authority

Castracane v Kasmier, 2026 NY Slip Op 05447 (3d Dept Sept. 24, 2026).

Related Authority

Photo Credit: Luis Lara

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