Who Is a Statutory Agent Under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6)?
A practical guide to when construction managers, prime contractors, subcontractors, property managers, individuals, and specialty contractors enter the class of parties subject to New York’s nondelegable construction-safety duties.
Quick Answer
What makes a defendant a statutory agent?
A non-owner or non-general-contractor is a statutory agent under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) when an owner or contractor has delegated authority over the work or area that produced the injury. The inquiry concerns the right and ability to supervise or control that work—not merely whether the defendant actually gave the plaintiff day-to-day instructions.
The analysis is functional and scope-specific. A construction manager may be an agent for one trade but not another. A subcontractor may be an agent within its own delegated work and nowhere else. A permit, job title, safety clause, site presence, or power to report a hazard can matter, but no label or isolated fact automatically resolves the issue.
Statutory Framework
Why statutory-agent status matters.
Labor Law § 240(1)
Section 240(1) places its elevation-safety duty on “contractors and owners and their agents.” Once a defendant falls within that class, lack of actual supervision does not by itself defeat liability for a proven statutory violation and causation.
Labor Law § 241(6)
Section 241(6) likewise reaches owners, contractors, and their agents. Agent status answers only the covered-defendant question. The plaintiff must still identify a sufficiently specific, applicable Industrial Code provision, prove a violation, and establish proximate causation. Comparative negligence remains relevant to § 241(6).
Owners and general contractors generally face nondelegable duties because of their statutory status. The “agent” issue most often arises when the defendant is a construction manager, prime contractor, subcontractor, property manager, consultant, supplier, or individual who does not fit neatly within the owner-or-general-contractor categories.
Controlling Rule
Start with delegation, then trace the authority it carried.
The Court of Appeals’ formulation in Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son remains the foundation: when the work giving rise to the statutory duty is delegated to a third party, the third party may acquire the corresponding authority to supervise and control the work and become the owner’s or contractor’s statutory agent.
The practical question is not “Did this defendant call itself the general contractor?” It is “Could this defendant make decisions about the injury-producing work and require compliance?” Working formulation drawn from Russin, Walls, Nascimento, and later cases
Identify the delegator.
Who owned the project, retained the contractor, or possessed statutory responsibility?
Define the delegated work.
Was the defendant entrusted with the project, a trade, a phase, a location, or a discrete task?
Locate the authority.
Could it hire, schedule, coordinate, direct, stop, correct, or enforce safety?
Test practical access.
Could it enter the area, communicate with the trade, and require a change?
Connect the accident.
Did the injury arise from the work or area within the delegated sphere?
The right to control can be enough.
Courts repeatedly distinguish between possessing authority and exercising it. Where a contract and the parties’ course of conduct vest a defendant with the power to supervise the relevant work, the defendant ordinarily cannot avoid statutory-agent status merely because it chose not to use that power or subcontracted the work further.
But general oversight is not always control.
The ability to observe work, report unsafe conduct, recommend corrective action, review progress, or invoke an emergency stop may be evidence of authority. Standing alone, however, such powers may be too remote if the defendant could not direct the trade, choose the means and methods, enforce compliance, or affect the injury-producing work.
Proof Signals
What evidence moves the agency analysis?
Strong indicators
Contractual authority to supervise the trade; power to hire or retain subcontractors; scheduling and coordination of the work; control of site access; authority to stop and correct unsafe work; providing daily direction; responsibility for the project safety plan.
Context-dependent facts
Presence at safety meetings; inspections; approval of submittals; quality-control review; supplying equipment; issuing permits; coordinating deliveries; maintaining logs; a title such as “construction manager,” “project manager,” or “owner’s representative.”
Often insufficient alone
A name on a permit; a generic duty to comply with law; a right to report hazards; authority limited to schedule or budget; occasional site visits; no access to the work area; no contract for the work; no power over the plaintiff’s employer or task.
| Evidence | Why it matters | What to verify |
|---|---|---|
| Prime contract or construction-management agreement | Defines the original delegation and the defendant’s formal authority. | Scope, exclusions, safety provisions, hiring power, stop-work rights, access, and responsibility for trade coordination. |
| Subcontracts and purchase orders | Show whether the defendant accepted responsibility for the precise trade or task. | Who retained whom, who could terminate, who supplied protection, and whether the work was re-delegated. |
| Daily reports, schedules, and meeting minutes | Reveal how authority operated in practice and whether the defendant coordinated the work. | Directives, corrections, sequencing, access restrictions, unresolved hazards, and instructions to the plaintiff’s employer. |
| Deposition testimony | Can establish or defeat practical authority even when contract language is ambiguous. | Who could stop work, demand correction, exclude workers, choose equipment, or communicate binding instructions. |
| Permits, titles, and organizational charts | May corroborate a role but rarely substitute for proof of authority. | Whether the named role was accepted, performed, or contradicted by contracts and testimony. |
Party-by-Party Analysis
Who can become a statutory agent?
Construction managers
A construction manager is not automatically an agent and is not automatically immune. Agency becomes more likely when no separate general contractor exists and the manager is the owner’s operational representative—coordinating trades, enforcing a safety plan, controlling access, stopping unsafe work, and possessing authority to require compliance.
Compare Walls, Mannino, and Veloso with decisions finding only monitoring, reporting, or advisory authority.
Prime contractors and subcontractors
A prime or subcontractor may be an agent within the work delegated to it. The critical link is authority over the trade or task that produced the injury. A contractor cannot necessarily escape the statute by subcontracting its entire scope; the act of retaining the lower-tier contractor may itself demonstrate the requisite authority.
The analysis is narrow: control of one trade does not create project-wide liability for unrelated work.
Property and building managers
A manager can become an owner’s statutory agent by contracting for the work, selecting the general contractor, issuing daily project instructions, or receiving delegated authority over the renovation. Ordinary building administration, rent collection, or maintenance duties alone do not necessarily create agency for a separate construction project.
Martin and Morina show how direct contracting and delegated project authority can move a manager into the statutory class.
Individuals and non-titleholders
A person who does not own the property can still act as the owner’s agent. Hiring the worker with the owner’s authorization, furnishing tools or materials, setting the job, or directing the work can support agency. Spousal status, family relationship, or informal involvement, without delegated authority, is not enough by itself.
Castro v Brito is a useful recent example of an individual agent.
Architects, engineers, safety consultants, and specialty suppliers
Sections 240 and 241 contain protections for architects and engineers who do not direct or control the work beyond professional planning and design. Safety consultants, inspectors, scaffold erectors, and equipment suppliers are judged by the authority actually delegated. Inspection rights, code-compliance language, or an obligation to report hazards may not be enough when the defendant lacks authority over the worker, trade, or worksite.
Wheeler illustrates the limits of agency for a scaffold contractor whose scope did not include control of the injury-producing work.
Do Not Collapse the Tests
Statutory agency is not the same as Labor Law § 200 control.
The most important analytical separation is between the authority sufficient to create statutory-agent status under §§ 240(1) and 241(6) and the actual supervision or control generally required for a means-and-methods claim under Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence.
Sections 240(1) and 241(6)
Contractual or delegated authority over the relevant work may be enough. The defendant’s failure to exercise that authority does not necessarily remove it from the statutory class.
Section 200 — means and methods
The plaintiff ordinarily must show that the defendant actually directed or controlled the manner in which the injury-producing work was performed. General authority or safety oversight may be insufficient.
Veloso v Scaturro Bros. makes the distinction concrete. Conflicting evidence concerning a construction manager’s delegated authority created a factual issue under §§ 240(1) and 241(6), while the § 200 and negligence claims were dismissed because the manager did not actually direct or control the plaintiff’s work.
Foundational Authorities
The cases that shape the rule.
Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son
The foundational delegation case. A third party becomes a statutory agent when the work giving rise to the duty is delegated and the party obtains corresponding authority to supervise and control it. The party’s liability is limited to the delegated sphere.
File lesson: Begin with the chain of contracts and map the accident to a specific delegated scope.
Walls v Turner Construction Co.
Turner functioned as the owner’s broad construction representative where no general contractor existed. Contractual duties, overall site supervision, authority over trades, and power to stop unsafe work supported statutory agency.
File lesson: “Eyes and ears” language becomes significant when it is paired with real decision-making authority.
Weber v Baccarat, Inc.
Contractual authority to supervise the relevant work supported agent status. The court treated actual exercise of that authority as immaterial to the threshold agency inquiry.
File lesson: Do not limit discovery to who gave instructions on the accident date; investigate who had the right to do so.
Nascimento v Bridgehampton Construction Corp.
A subcontractor is liable only when it possessed authority over the work giving rise to the statutory obligation. The same statutory-agency analysis applies to §§ 240(1) and 241(6).
File lesson: Ask whether the accident arose from the subcontractor’s own trade, assigned work area, or delegated responsibility.
Tuccillo v Bovis Lend Lease, Inc.
A contractor that accepted work and subcontracted it remained potentially liable as a statutory agent. Overlapping authority among several parties did not eliminate agency, and actual supervision was not required once the authority was established.
File lesson: More than one statutory agent may exist; control need not be exclusive.
Lamar v Hill International, Inc.
Construction-management duties involving review, monitoring, recommendations, and emergency intervention did not establish authority over the plaintiff’s means and methods on that record.
File lesson: A safety role must be examined closely; a right to warn is not necessarily a right to direct.
Recent Appellate Decisions
Statutory-agent cases from 2025–2026.
The recent decisions do not change the governing rule. They show where the factual lines are being drawn: direct contracting and broad project authority often establish agency; permits, generic compliance clauses, and attenuated involvement often do not; conflicting scope provisions frequently produce a trial issue.
Agent — First Department, 2025
Barreto v Board of Managers of 545 W. 110th St. Condominium
The window-washing contractor retained by the building remained a statutory agent after it subcontracted the work. Its authority was demonstrated by accepting the project and selecting the lower-tier contractor; whether it actually supervised the plaintiff was irrelevant.
Agent — First Department, 2025
Castro v Brito
A non-owner individual acted as the owner’s agent by hiring the plaintiff with the owner’s authorization and furnishing materials and tools for the roof repair. Formal title ownership was not required.
Fact issue — First Department, 2025
Mannino v Waldorf Exteriors, LLC
Questions remained concerning a construction manager described as the owner’s “eyes and ears” with stop-work authority, and concerning demolition subcontractors whose earlier work may have destabilized the falling material.
No agent — Fourth Department, 2025
Wheeler v BrandSafway Industries, LLC
The scaffold contractor was not a statutory agent where it lacked authority over the plaintiff, the injury-producing work, and the worksite. A clause requiring legal and safety compliance did not, without more, delegate control of the project or the worker’s task.
Fact issue — First Department, 2026
Veloso v Scaturro Bros., Inc.
Broad construction-management authority, a project safety plan, and stop-work power supported agency; contrary contract language, lack of lead-abatement credentials, and exclusion from the containment area pointed the other way. The conflict required a trial.
Agent — First Department, 2026
Calle v 686 Broadway Realty, LLC
The general contractor oversaw the build-out, retained trades, set schedules, coordinated work, and bore overall safety responsibility. It remained a proper Labor Law defendant even though another entity retained the asbestos-abatement employer.
No agent — First Department, 2026
Perez v Kew Gardens Development Corp.
A permit listing the defendant’s principal as general contractor was insufficient where the defendant was not retained for that role, did not perform contracted work, never visited the site, and lacked authority over the plaintiff’s work.
Agent — First Department, 2026
Martin v Poe Affiliates, L.P.
The property manager was the owner’s statutory agent where it was delegated authority over the renovation, hired the general contractor, and gave general daily project instructions. Actual exercise of all available authority was not required.
Agent — First Department, 2026
Morina v 250 Broadway Associates Corp.
The building manager directly contracted for the lobby stone-panel work and possessed supervisory authority over the project. It qualified as the owner’s agent even if it did not personally supervise the plaintiff’s crew.
No agent — Second Department, 2026
Arias v Allen J. Reyen, Inc.
The corporate defendant established that it did not own the property, did not contract for work for its benefit, and was neither the general contractor nor the owner’s agent with respect to the plaintiff’s barn work.
Early Investigation
Build the authority record before memories narrow.
Statutory-agent disputes are document-heavy, but the documents rarely speak for themselves. The early investigation should pair the contract chain with testimony about what actually happened when a trade needed access, a hazard required correction, a schedule changed, or unsafe work continued.
Contract chain
Owner agreement, construction-management agreement, prime contracts, subcontracts, amendments, purchase orders, and incorporated general conditions.
Project authority
Organizational charts, site logistics plans, safety plans, delegation letters, superintendent duties, and responsibility matrices.
Operational proof
Daily reports, meeting minutes, schedules, RFIs, directives, correction notices, stop-work records, emails, texts, and access logs.
Trade control
Who retained the plaintiff’s employer, approved its work, sequenced it, supplied protection, inspected it, or could remove the crew.
Accident nexus
The precise task, work area, equipment, preceding trade work, and whether the alleged authority reached the injury-producing condition.
Contradictory evidence
Contract exclusions, licensing limits, containment restrictions, testimony disclaiming authority, and records showing another entity controlled the work.
Questions to ask the project witnesses.
- Who could require the plaintiff’s employer to change its work?
- Who could stop the work, and what happened after a stop?
- Who set the daily sequence and controlled access to the area?
- Who selected, hired, or could terminate the plaintiff’s employer?
- Who approved safety plans, fall protection, scaffolds, or temporary protection?
- Could the defendant issue a binding directive or only make a recommendation?
- Was the defendant excluded from the area by license, containment, or contract?
- Did the defendant’s earlier work create or destabilize the condition?
- Did authority overlap with another contractor, owner representative, or manager?
- What did the parties actually do when unsafe work was observed?
Summary-Judgment Burdens
Agency must be proved—not assumed.
Plaintiff seeking judgment
The plaintiff must establish that the defendant is an owner, contractor, or statutory agent and then prove the elements of the underlying § 240(1) or § 241(6) claim. A conclusory title, permit, or assertion of “site control” does not eliminate the need for admissible proof of delegated authority.
Defendant seeking dismissal
A non-owner defendant should affirmatively establish the absence of a contract for the work, authority over the relevant trade, power to supervise or control the task, and a nexus to the worksite. Silence or a witness’s legal conclusion that the defendant “was not the general contractor” may be inadequate.
When opposing a motion, conflicting contractual provisions, disputed stop-work authority, inconsistent testimony, or uncertainty about access and trade coordination may create a triable issue. But ambiguity should be tied to the injury-producing work; a generalized dispute over the defendant’s project role is not always enough.
Reserve and Settlement Implications
Translate the agency proof into exposure levels.
Strong statutory-agent showing
The defendant accepted the precise work, retained the trade, controlled scheduling and access, could stop or correct unsafe work, and the accident arose directly from that delegated scope. Reserve as a covered-party case and turn quickly to the merits, causation, damages, and risk transfer.
Meaningful factual dispute
Broad authority is offset by exclusions, specialty-trade limits, lack of access, licensing restrictions, or testimony that another entity exclusively directed the work. Treat agency as a motion and trial risk rather than a dependable dismissal point.
Limited or trade-specific exposure
The defendant controlled a defined trade or phase, but the accident’s connection to that scope is disputed. Focus discovery on the sequence of work, who created the hazard, and whether the defendant’s authority had ended before the accident.
Strong non-agent position
The defendant did not contract for the work, did not benefit from it, had no authority over the trade or area, never visited or accessed the site, and is linked only by a permit, title, generic compliance clause, or corporate relationship. Preserve the clean separation through consistent testimony and records.
Agency does not decide risk transfer.
A finding that a party is a statutory agent does not automatically establish negligence, contractual indemnification, common-law indemnification, additional-insured status, or insurance priority. Those issues require separate analysis of the indemnity language, anti-indemnity statute, negligence record, insurance endorsements, tender history, and contractual privity.
Motion Strategy
Frame the motion around authority, scope, and nexus.
For a plaintiff
Lead with the contract that delegated the work. Then corroborate it with testimony showing the defendant’s power to hire, schedule, coordinate, stop, correct, or direct the trade. Connect each authority fact to the task, area, or condition that produced the injury.
For a defendant
Define the limits before discussing the accident. Identify the defendant’s actual contract, exclusions, lack of access, inability to bind the trade, and absence of authority over the worker. Explain who did possess the disputed authority and support the distinction with project records.
Avoid the recurring motion errors.
Do not equate “no one told plaintiff how to do the task” with absence of statutory agency. Do not rely solely on a corporate representative’s legal conclusion. Do not treat a stop-work clause as dispositive without explaining its operation. Do not ignore earlier work by another trade. And do not assume that dismissal of § 200 compels dismissal of §§ 240(1) and 241(6)—or vice versa.
Frequently Asked Questions
Common statutory-agent questions.
Must the defendant actually supervise the plaintiff?
Is every construction manager a statutory agent?
Can a subcontractor be an agent of the owner or general contractor?
Does subcontracting the work eliminate agency?
Is stop-work authority enough?
Does being named on a permit make a party the general contractor or agent?
Can more than one statutory agent exist?
Does statutory-agent status establish liability under § 241(6)?
Are architects and engineers automatically statutory agents?
Primary Authorities
Cases and statutes cited in this guide.
The File-Level Rule
Follow the authority—not the title.
Identify the work that was delegated, the authority that accompanied it, and the connection between that authority and the accident. That sequence usually reveals whether the defendant is a statutory agent, a party with only general oversight, or a contractor whose authority ended outside the injury-producing work.