NY Snow Removal Liability Under Espinal

At a Glance

Summary: The maintenance defendants could not obtain summary judgment because their own contracts and testimony suggested they were responsible for continuously monitoring and clearing ice at a bank entrance before employees arrived. For claims adjusters and litigators, the decision reinforces that a contractor’s no-duty argument under Espinal may fail when the contractor’s undertaking is comprehensive enough to displace the property owner’s duty or when the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the contractor’s continued performance.

Court: New York Appellate Division, Third Department

Decision Date: June 18, 2025

Case: Butler v Vestal Parkway Plaza, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 03678, 239 AD3d 1177 (3d Dept 2025)

Topic: Commercial snow removal liability.

The Court’s Position

A snow removal contractor does not owe a duty to a noncontracting plaintiff unless one of the Espinal v Melville Snow Contractors, Inc. exceptions applies, including detrimental reliance or complete displacement of the property owner’s maintenance obligations. Here, triable issues of fact existed as to both exceptions, precluding summary judgment.

From a Claims Adjuster’s Perspective

Do not assume snow removal contractors are insulated from liability. Where contracts impose continuous monitoring obligations or the facts suggest reliance by occupants, exposure may extend beyond the property owner and must be evaluated early in claims handling.

What Happened

The plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside her workplace at Citizens Bank. US Maintenance (USM) contracted with the bank to handle snow and ice removal. USM subcontracted the work to James Gresham, doing business as J.G. Maintenance Construction Services (Gresham).

Gresham last salted the site three days before the incident. Water runoff from the roof above the bank entrance formed clear ice, a known hazard.

The Decision

The Third Department affirmed the motion court’s denial of the maintenance defendants’ (USM and Gresham) motion for summary judgment. The Court reasoned that factual questions existed as to whether (1) the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the maintenance defendants’ obligations, (2) the maintenance defendants entirely displaced Citizens Bank’s duty to maintain the sidewalk, and (3) the plaintiff’s coworkers’ occasional salting eliminated the maintenance defendants’ duty.

Practical Impact

Expands exposure beyond property owner:
Contractors can remain in the case even without direct contractual privity with the injured plaintiff.

Contract language is outcome determinative:
Broad obligations such as “continuous monitoring” and pre-opening clearance can increase the risk that a court will find an assumed duty.

Operational reality matters as much as contract terms:
Evidence that the contractor routinely handled recurring conditions (like roof drip ice) undermines defense arguments.

Employee “self-help” does not eliminate a contractor’s duty:
Occasional salting by employees did not eliminate the triable issues concerning the plaintiff’s reliance or the maintenance defendants’ obligations.

Timing of last service is critical:
A three-day gap between service and the incident was among the facts supporting the existence of triable issues.

Strategic Insight

Espinal remains the controlling framework
Defense strategy must focus on defeating all three exceptions, especially detrimental reliance and displacement.
Summary judgment is difficult where contracts are broad
Courts scrutinize whether contractual duties are “comprehensive and exclusive.”
Foreseeability is tied to known recurring conditions
Contractor awareness of recurring ice (roof runoff) strengthens the plaintiff’s case.
Internal inconsistencies in defense proof can defeat the motion
The defendants’ own submissions created triable issues of fact.
Non-delegable duty arguments can be indirectly revived
Complete-displacement arguments can turn on functional responsibility for the premises. Even where the contract does not expressly transfer every maintenance obligation, the displacement analysis may focus on the practical scope of the contractor’s responsibilities.

Practice Pointers

Draft tighter contracts
Avoid language suggesting continuous monitoring or exclusive control unless intended.

Develop a “no reliance” record early
Establish that property owners and employees retained responsibility and acted independently.

Document service frequency rigorously
Service logs should accurately document the scope, timing, and reason for each visit without suggesting obligations broader than those imposed by the contract.

Neutralize recurring condition evidence
Address known issues (like drainage) through documented mitigation measures.

Frame summary judgment around Espinal elements explicitly
Do not rely on general “no duty” arguments alone.

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Matthew Lerner is a New York civil litigation and appellate attorney at Gerber Ciano Kelly Brady LLP and the publisher of New York Civil Law. He writes about New York appellate decisions, insurance coverage, Labor Law, and litigation strategy for claims professionals and trial attorneys.

Primary Authority

The Court relied primarily on Espinal v Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., which governs when a contractor may owe a duty to a third party despite lack of contractual privity.

Sources

Questions This Case Answers:

When does a snow removal contractor owe a duty to a noncontracting plaintiff?
What contract language creates “complete displacement” of a property owner’s duty?
How is detrimental reliance established in slip-and-fall cases?
Can sporadic employee snow removal defeat contractor liability?
How important are service logs and timing in defeating summary judgment?
Does knowledge of recurring ice conditions increase contractor exposure?
What evidence defeats a contractor’s “no duty” argument under Espinal?

New York Civil Law